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Abstract
We develop a model of knowledge sharing in alliances and alliance portfolios. We show that once the
issue of encouraging e¤ective collaboration is put center-stage, many standard intuitions of the learning
race view and alliance portfolio literature are overturned or qualied. Partners engage in learning races
in some cases, but exhibit altruisticbehaviors in other cases. They may reduce their own absorptive
capacity, or increase the transparency of their own operations, to facilitate their partners learning. In
alliance portfolios, we show that not all substitutability between alliance portfolio partners is bad. We
distinguish between substitutability in implementation and substitutability in rival benets, and show
that the latter is conducive to knowledge sharing. Our work contributes towards putting the literature
on learning alliances on a more solid foundation by emphasizing the importance of commitments that
leading rms can make to encourage collaboration.
Keywords: knowledge sharing, learning alliances, alliance portfolios, commitment, learning races.
JEL Classication: D21, D23, L24.
1 Introduction
Learning alliances, where an important objective of the partners is the creation of new knowledge, are
di¢ cult to manage. On the one hand, the partnering rms (who may also be competitors) must share
knowledge to create new knowledge, and cooperatively exploit this jointly created new knowledge (Hen-
nart, 1988; Mitchell and Singh, 1996). This gives them a common purpose. On the other hand, the
partners must divide the gains from collaboration. The negotiations are a¤ected by the relative bargain-
ing positions after sharing, which depend upon how e¢ ciently rms have learned from each other, and
how well positioned they are to exploit that learning without the cooperation of the partner (Hamel, 1991;
Yan and Gray, 1994; Panico, 2017).
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In many cases, the new knowledge created cannot be accurately foreseen nor adequately distinguished
from what is already known by the partners. Thus, rms cannot contract or commit to jointly exploit
it. Any existing contract or joint venture terms are subject to renegotiation under the threat that one
partner or the other may walk away (Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Hart, 1986). As a result, rms
may be reluctant to collaborate and share knowledge ex ante, if they expect to nd themselves in a weak
bargaining position ex post.
Consider for instance the alliance between Nypro and Vistakon, a division of Johnson & Johnson
(Christensen, 1994). The goal of this alliance was to develop single-use lensmolds for disposable contact
lenses. While the project required substantial joint problem-solving, conicts arose when attempts were
made to more fully integrate the two rms engineering teams. Senior managers at Nypro opposed
these attempts, on the ground that they could compromise Nypros intellectual property and bargaining
position. Christensen highlights three key concerns. First, Nypro managers noted that although Nypro
held several patents, much of its technology was not patented, as it involved process innovations that were
best protected through trade secrets. One concern was that Vistakon engineers, after learning trade secrets
from Nypro, could take jobs with injection molders directly competing with Nypro. A second concern
was that Vistakon could use this information to develop alternative technologies to making lenses, which
Vistakon was free to explore in parallel with its program with Nypro. Third, Nypro worried that, if the
project was successful, Vistakon could use its better understanding of Nypros manufacturing process to
constrain Nypros pricing exibility and bargaining power in future supply contracts. For these reasons,
knowledge sharing with Vistakon had to be managed carefully, and sometimes constrained.
Naturally alliance partners may attempt to mitigate such risks from knowledge sharing. Much of the
literature focuses on defence mechanisms that rms can use to protect their knowledge from expropria-
tion (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Katila et al., 2008). Here we take a complementary perspective and study
organizational commitments that leading rms can use to encourage knowledge sharing when appropri-
ability hazards are present (Schelling, 1960; Williamson, 1983). Nypro was concerned that sharing its
knowledge, though vital to the success of the alliance, would hurt its bargaining position in the alliance.
Therefore, if Vistakon could commit not to take advantage of Nypro, the latter would be more likely to
share knowledge.
Our focus on commitments to encourage knowledge sharing yields recommendations that are often
very di¤erent from, and sometimes diametrically opposed to, what some strategic management approaches
suggest. A key tenet of the learning race literature (Hamel, 1991; Yan and Gray, 1994; Inkpen and
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Beamish, 1997; Khanna et al., 1998) is that alliance partners should maximize their receptivity to the
knowledge and skills of their partner while limiting the transparency of their own operations(Mowery et
al., 2002: 298). In our framework, rms engage in learning racesin some cases but exhibit altruistic
behaviors in other cases. This may help explain some apparently puzzling behaviors, such as Toyotas
willingness to teach lean manufacturing to GM, a competitor (Inkpen, 2005). It may also help explain
why sometimes rms such as Intel, Toyota, and Cisco appear to deliberately reduce their own learning
capability through internal Chinese walls (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000;
Steinhilber, 2008).1
Leading rms may also commit to low appropriation of a partners knowledge by creating alliance port-
folios with desirable characteristics. Existing research suggests that synergies between partners encourage
collaboration, while partner substitutability hinders it by exacerbating competitive tensions (McEvily et
al., 2000; Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Lavie, 2007). However, empirical work on the e¤ects of partner substi-
tutability or similarity has yielded largely inconclusive results (Goerzen and Beamish, 2005; Swaminathan
and Moorman, 2009; Vasudeva and Anand, 2011; Cui and OConnor, 2012; Cui, 2013).
We provide a potential explanation for these mixed results by distinguishing between two types of
partner substitutability: substitutability in implementation and substitutability in rival benets. Sub-
stitutability in implementation refers to situations where the contribution of a former partner A to the
implementation of a project can partly be replaced by the contribution of a staying partner B. Because
this type of substitutability makes it easier for the focal rm, F , to rst appropriate As knowledge and
then terminate the alliance with A, As incentives to share knowledge are reduced. Thus, substitutability
in implementation hinders knowledge sharing.
Substitutability in rival benets, by contrast, refers to a situation where the focal rm F does not
gain much by appropriating the knowledge of both A and B, relative to appropriating the knowledge
of only A or B. Intuitively, if A and Bs knowledge bases overlap signicantly, the marginal returns to
appropriating partnersknowledge may be decreasing. In this case, although knowledge sharing in a single
alliance may be unfeasible, we show that knowledge sharing in a portfolio (with both A and B) can be
feasible.
A second implication of our analysis that a focal rm F is often better o¤ by choosing partners that
are neither too similar nor too dissimilar to each other. This is because partner substitutability (both
1Our focus on knowledge sharing also yields the counter-intuitive result that uncertainty about outcomes need not al-
ways hinder knowledge sharing. Instead, greater uncertainty (in the form of mean preserving spreads) or even asymmetric
information may actually facilitate knowledge sharing.
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in implementation and rival benets) a¤ects in opposite ways the probability of knowledge sharing and
the share of value captured by the focal rm. Thus, as suggested by some recent studies (Swaminathan
and Moorman, 2009; Vasudeva and Anand, 2011), the relationship between alliance value and partner
substitutability may rst increase and then decline.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, by emphasizing the need to encourage knowledge
sharing, we contribute toward putting the literature on learning alliances on a more solid foundation.
Scholars have noted that many of the learning race views recommendations su¤er from a failure to
recognize that the processes of value creation and value appropriation are inextricably linked (e.g., Zeng
and Hennart, 2002). Some have also argued that the notion of a race to learn is largely unrealistic,
for it is unclear what would motivate a likely loser to join the race (Inkpen, 2002: 272). This paper
incorporates a knowledge sharing constraint into a model of learning in alliances, and shows that its
inclusion has important consequences for how alliances should be managed. In particular, the model may
help explain why, although learning is an important goal in many alliances, only few rms actually appear
to have a racing intent (Mowery et al., 1996; Hennart et al., 1999; Inkpen, 2000).
The second main contribution of the paper is to re-orient attention in strategy and economics from
the problem of how rms can protect their intellectual assets (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Katila et al., 2008),
to the problem of how leading rms can promote the health of their innovation ecosystems. Iansiti and
Levien (2004) distinguish between keystone organizations, which share the benets from collaboration
with their partners, and physical dominators, which focus on value appropriation. We examine how
keystone organizations can use commitment to help create ecosystems conducive to knowledge sharing
and innovation.
1.1 Related literature
This paper is related to several strands of the literature on alliances. By emphasizing contractual incom-
pleteness and ex ante investment incentives, our model builds on the property-rights view of the rm. This
literature studies how property rights should be allocated when concerns about hold-up reduce partners
investment incentives (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). A key insight of this literature
is that, to maximize ex ante e¢ ciency, property rights should be assigned to the party whose investment
matters most to joint value creation. Aghion and Tirole (1994), however, point out that an optimal
allocation of property rights may not be achieved if one of the partners is cash constrained. Panico (2017)
argues that ownership structures that give partners strong incentives to create value may also give them
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strong incentives to engage in value appropriation. He studies how di¤erent ownership structures a¤ect
value creation and appropriation when partners interact only once or repeatedly. This paper develops a
model where partnersinvestments are equally costly and important; hence, an equitable division of the
gains from collaboration tends to promote investment.2 The problem we emphasize is that investment
may alter the partnersbargaining positions (i.e., their outside options).3
A few papers examine how shifts in bargaining positions a¤ect investment incentives. Nicita and Sepe
(2012) note that, when investment a¤ects outside options, overinvestment as well as underinvestment
can occur. de Fontenay and Gans (2005), Patacconi and Vikander (2015) and Herbst and Walz (2017)
explore in di¤erent settings the idea that bargaining with other potential partners determines each rms
outside option. We focus on organizational commitments to encourage investment. The commitments
we emphasize are constraints to ones own absorptive capacity and alliance portfolio design. Panico
(2017) examines incentives to invest in value appropriation, which could be interpreted as investments in
absorptive capacity. However, in Panicos model, investments in value appropriation and investments in
value capture are chosen simultaneously. Commitment, on the other hand, requires a sequential choice.45
The commitments that have been more extensively studied in economics are contractual or equity-
based (e.g., Williamson, 1983; Oxley, 1997). Williamson (1983) considers a model where producers
can make relationship-specic investments but such investments create the potential for hold-up. He
shows that, under some conditions, e¢ cient contracting can be achieved if the buyer posts a hostage
(such as a termination fee) that is delivered to the producer if the order is cancelled. Equity alliances
(those involving the sharing or exchange of equity) can also be conceptualized as commitments. These
structures embody complex administrative structures that enhance control over technology ows and
facilitate collaboration (Pisano, 1989; Oxley and Wada, 2009). In Section 5, we conclude that, although
these contractual solutions ameliorate the problem of shifting bargaining positions, they only ensure
2Such balanced division may result from an equitable allocation of property rights, as in Panicos (2017) case of symmetric
control, or from negotiations between a monopsonistic customers and the owner of an innovation, as in Aghion and Tiroles
(1994) case of RU-ownership.
3Most of the property-rights literature assumes that asset ownership, but not investment, a¤ects partnersoutside options.
4Panico (2011) develops a model where a focal rm selects prior to investment both the fraction of property rights and the
fraction of control rights assigned to each partner. Property rights a¤ect the partnersoutside options, while control rights
a¤ects how the surplus from collaboration is divided between the partners. Panico nds that, in equilibrium, ownership and
control rights are often substitutes. We obtain a similar result in Section 5, where we consider equity alliances. However, in
addition to contractual solutions, our paper also considers organizational commitments (restrictions to ones own absorptive
capacity and alliance portfolio design).
5This paper is also related to the biform approach used in the literature on value creation and capture (e.g., Brandenburger
and Stuart, 2007; Ryall and Sorenson, 2007). In our model, commitments and investments inknowledge sharing occur
sequentially in the rst noncooperative stage, and payo¤s results from negotiations in the second cooperative stage.
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e¢ ciency under stringent conditions. Thus, organizational commitments remain important.6
We focus on learning alliances and investments in knowledge sharing. Our analysis is motivated by
the observation that knowledge sharing often alters the partnersbargaining positions through knowledge
spillovers. Information leakage and knowledge misappropriation are often cited as a major drawbacks
of R&D collaborations (Veugelers and Kesteloot, 1994; Arora and Merges, 2004; Katila et al., 2008).7
Knowledge sharing can also shift the balance of power in favor of the alliance partner that learns the
fastest, potentially giving rise to learning races and instabilities (Hamel, 1991; Yan and Gray, 1994;
Inkpen and Beamish, 1997).
The literature has largely focused on how rms can protect themselves against their knowledge
spillovers in alliances. Katila et al. (2008), for instance, nd that startups are more likely to enter
corporate investment relationships with incumbents when they can defend themselves against misappro-
priation. Defence mechanisms include not only patents and secrecy (Cohen et al., 2000), but also the
selection of partners with limited opportunistic intent (Khanna et al., 1998; Baum et al., 2000; Dus-
sauge et al., 2000). How leading rms can use commitments to encourage knowledge sharing within their
ecosystems has been much less extensively studied. Our contribution is to show that incorporating ex ante
knowledge sharing considerations in a model of learning alliances has important implications for alliance
management.
Finally, our alliance portfolio design analysis is related to a growing literature examining how network
structure a¤ects knowledge sharing (Hansen, 2002; Argote et al., 2003; Reagans and McEvily, 2003). The
similarity of knowledge sources within a network is often regarded as an obstacle to e¤ective knowledge
sharing, both because it reduces knowledge variety and because it creates competitive tensions (e.g.,
Baum et al., 2000). However, empirical ndings have been mixed (e.g., Goerzen and Beamish, 2005;
Swaminathan and Moorman, 2009; Cui 2013). Our work may help reconcile these mixed ndings by
highlighting a type of knowledge redundancy (substitutability in rival benets) that can actually facilitate
knowledge sharing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 2. There we
show that shifts in bargaining positions can destabilize alliances. Section 2.1 examines how uncertainty
and di¤erent types of uncertainty resolution a¤ect knowledge sharing. Subsequent sections focus on
6Our analysis focuses only on a few specic contracts; other contracts may perform better. See Segal and Whinston (2013)
for a discussion of when/how contracts can ameliorate the hold-up problem.
7Veugelers and Kesteloot (1994, 1996) examine how knowledge spillovers between partners a¤ect the stability of alliances.
While these models capture the idea that knowledge spillovers undermine alliance stability, they do not investigate the role
of commitments in facilitating knowledge sharing ex ante.
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commitments to facilitate knowledge sharing. Specically, we examine: investments in absorptive capacity
(Section 3), alliance portfolio design (Section 4), and contracts (Section 5). Section 6 concludes. Proofs
are relegated to the online appendix.
2 Model
There are two rms, F and A, that participate in an alliance or collaboration. We will sometimes refer
to F as the focal rm, because it may be involved in more than one alliance.
In period 0 (the commitment stage), the rms take actions that inuence how their payo¤s in future
periods will evolve. We postpone the discussion of these actions (which in some cases can be interpreted
as commitments) to Sections 3 to 5. For now, we assume that no actions or commitments are available
in period 0.
In period 1 (the knowledge sharing stage), the rms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose
whether to invest in knowledge sharing. We assume that these investments are not contractible. For
instance, in the Nypro-Vistakon example discussed in the introduction, investments in knowledge sharing
would involve a more extensive integration between the two rmsengineering teams than actually carried
out. We assume that, if the rms invest in knowledge sharing, then each of them incurs a private cost
1
2I > 0. Thus, I denotes the total cost associated with knowledge sharing.
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If F and A do not invest, then knowledge sharing costs are not incurred and F and A obtain their
baselinepayo¤s, which we normalize to zero. These payo¤s may correspond to either if the alliance is
not formed or where an alliance is in place, but appropriability hazards prevent high levels of knowledge
sharing, as in the Nypro-Vistakon example. Thus, a payo¤ of zero may describe a situation where F and
A introduce a new product together, but the new product is not valuable, because of limited knowledge
sharing. If both rms invest in knowledge sharing, then payo¤s V , F and A are realized, where V is the
value of the alliance and F and A are, respectively, F and As (ex post) outside options. We assume
that there is no uncertainty about V , F and A. In Section 2.1, however, introduce uncertainty and both
the case of symmetric resolution of uncertainty (both rms learn the same information) and asymmetric
resolution of uncertainty (the rms learn di¤erent information) in period 2 (the uncertainty resolution
stage).
In period 3 (the negotiation stage), the rms choose whether to continue to work together and earn
V , or exit and obtain their outside options. If they continue to work together (i.e., they implement their
8The assumption that knowledge sharing costs 1
2
I are the same for F and A is just for simplicity. This assumption could
easily be relaxed without changing any of the qualitative results of the paper.
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project), then they must bargain over how to divide V . In the case of Nypro and Vistakon, implementation
means developing new disposable contact lenses together, and sharing the prots from this new product.
If instead F and A terminate their collaboration prematurely (before implementation), then F gets F
and A gets A. We allow F and A to di¤er from zero (the baseline payo¤s in the absence of knowledge
sharing) because knowledge sharing may a¤ect the rmscompetitive positions. For instance, F and
A may both be positive if both F and A learn something useful from their interaction that allows them
to improve their existing products, though of course one partner may learn more than the other (e.g.,
F > A). However, it could also be that one partner is expropriated by the other (e.g., F > 0,
A  0). This is the swimming with sharks or information leakage scenario highlighted by many
scholars (e.g., Veugelers and Kesteloot, 1994; Katila et al., 2008).
In the Nypro-Vistakon example, the risk that unwanted knowledge spillovers may help Vistakon
develop alternative technologies to making lenses implies that F > 0 (here F stands for Vistakon and A
stands for Nypro).9 Similarly, the concern that Vistakons better understanding of Nypros manufacturing
process could constrain Nypros pricing exibility and bargaining power in future supply contracts implies
that F > 0 or A < 0. As we shall see, even if the partners end up jointly implementing the innovation,
the ex-post outside options F and A a¤ect how F and A share their joint value V .
Note that F and A only accrue if the collaboration is prematurely terminated. Indeed, to the extent
that rm F can use the knowledge it gains from the alliance without jeopardizing the alliance itself, these
payo¤s would simply be added to both V and F , making the collaboration more attractive to F without
making it less attractive to A. Our interest, on the other hand, is in rival benetswhich can potentially
jeopardize the collaboration by making it less attractive to the other partner. In terms of our example,
Vistakon would only develop alternative technologies to making lenses if its collaboration with Nypro
was terminated. This outside option (worth F ) would only be used if their joint project (worth V ) was
not completed. Nevertheless, because Vistakon could terminate the collaboration and still develop an
alternative technology inuenced how the value of the joint project V was divided.
The key assumptions we make are that (i) it is impossible to contract on knowledge sharing, and that
(ii) the rms cannot commit ex ante (before knowledge sharing) to implement the project together ex
post. These assumptions imply that the rms cannot be forced to collaborate; neither in the initial phase
of knowledge sharing nor in the subsequent implementation phase. This could be because it is impossible
for a court to verify, for instance, that a rm has done its best to transmit its knowledge, or that a partner
9 It could also be that A < 0 if the development of these alternative technologies weakens Nypros competitive position
in the marketplace.
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is performing in a consummate rather than perfunctory fashion during co-development. In countries with
less developed institutions, these assumptions may also reect very high costs of using the legal system.
Note that rms will not unilaterally share knowledge. We assume that, if F shares knowledge with A
but A does not, then F pays the knowledge sharing cost 12I and A enjoys a benet 
u
A  0 (the superscript
u stands for unilateral knowledge sharing). If A shares knowledge but F does not, then A pays the cost
1
2I and F enjoys a benet 
u
F  0. Because knowledge sharing is not contractible, neither F nor A will
unilaterally share its knowledge. Figure 1 summarizes the sequence of events.
[Figure 1 about here]
In period 3, if the rms share knowledge and implement their project together, they must bargain
over the division of the surplus. We posit V  F +A. That is, after knowledge sharing, it is e¢ cient for
F and A to implement their project together. This could be because the partners have complementary
capabilities in developing and commercializing the new product, or because competition following a break-
up dissipate rents. We assume bargaining is e¢ cient and determined according to the Nash solution with
equal weights. Thus, the partnerspayo¤ are given by
i = i +
1
2
[V   F   A]  1
2
I, i = F;A: (1)
That is, each rm gets its ex post (after knowledge sharing) outside option i, plus half of the surplus
from implementation V  F A, minus the costs of knowledge sharing 12I. Knowledge sharing is e¢ cient
if V  I.
In a non-cooperative equilibrium, knowledge sharing occurs only if each rm i = F;A obtains more
when they both share knowledge than when they do not share knowledge:
i  0 (2)
We refer to (2) as is knowledge sharing constraint. If this constraint holds, we say that knowledge
sharing is privately protable for rm i (assuming that the other rm also shares knowledge). After some
manipulations, F and As knowledge sharing constraints can be rewritten as:
V   I  A   F (3)
V   I  F   A (4)
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Unsurprisingly, F and A are more likely to collaborate if knowledge sharing creates substantial value (V  I
large). However, partners also care about their relative bargaining positions. If A > F , then knowledge
sharing shifts bargaining power in favor of A (that is, outside options shift from (0; 0) to (F ; A), with
A > F ), which makes F less likely to share its knowledge (i.e., condition (3) is less likely to hold).
Conversely, if F > A, then bargaining power shifts in favor of F , and A is less likely to share knowledge
with F . Conditions (3) and (4) make clear that both rms will invest only if V   I  jF   Aj.10 Note
that the shifts in bargaining positions, as measured by jF   Aj, only inuence how the surplus generated
by the alliance is divided between F and A. The condition for the e¢ ciency of knowledge sharing, V > I,
does not depend on the relative magnitudes of F and A. Because V   I  jF   Aj is stronger than
V > I, as typical in property-rights models, the equilibrium can exhibit underinvestment.
We summarize this discussion as follows.
Proposition 1. Knowledge sharing is e¢ cient when V  I. However, it is privately protable for both
rms only when
V   I  jF   Aj . (5)
Proposition 1 captures the idea that some value-creating investments may not be undertaken when
knowledge sharing creates large shifts in bargaining positions. Value creation is important but asymme-
tries in the evolution of outside options create a wedge between equilibrium and socially e¢ cient outcomes.
Preserving the balance of power within the alliance (a low F   A in absolute value) helps reduce the
risk of underinvestment.
By emphasizing underinvestment in knowledge sharing rather than the failure of an alliance to be
formed, we implicitly assume that, despite underinvestment, the partners may still remain together, as
was the case in the Nypro-Vistakon example discussed above. The SEMATECH alliance is another case
in point. As Grindley et al. (1994: 730) write, SEMATECH was
[o]riginally intended to provide a research facility for member rms to collaborate on projects
to improve their semiconductor manufacturing process technology. [However,...] Process tech-
nology expertise is central to the competitive advantage of individual semiconductor manufac-
turers, and member rms were reluctant to share such sensitive information. The sophistica-
tion of the manufacturing technology of SEMATECH member rms also di¤ered considerably,
raising the danger that some rms could free rideon the contributions of technology leaders.
10This is not su¢ cient for knowledge sharing because if F believes that A will not invest, then, F will not invest even if
V   I  jF   Aj. Here we ignore this coordination problem.
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In response to these controversies, SEMATECH altered its research agenda [...] The new
research agenda has shifted the consortiums focus from the development of a complete state-of-
the-art production process in its Austin facility to knowledge di¤usion and technology transfer.
SEMATECH provides another example where appropriability hazards and competitive tensions among
member rms prevented participants from fully sharing their knowledge. However, appropriability hazards
did not lead to the termination of the alliance. Instead, the goal of the alliance was altered, to focus on
areas where competitive tensions were less severe.
In addition to noncontractible investment, several other features of the model are also well-suited for
the analysis of knowledge sharing. In our model, partnersinvestments are highly complementary (V is
only created if both partners invest). Our results remain valid for arbitrarily small investment costs.11 A
rms investment may a¤ect not only its own outside option, but also the outside option of its partner. It
is di¢ cult to think of many investments not involving knowledge sharing where all these assumptions are
veried. Also, the next section will consider investments in absorptive capacity. There, we will show that
a strongpartner may invest resources to restrict its own absorptive capacity, thus lowering the value of
its outside option. In the case of more traditional investments in physical or human capital, we would
instead expect investment to improve ones own outside options.
2.1 Uncertainty
This subsection explores how uncertainty a¤ects rmsincentives to share knowledge. We consider two
scenarios: symmetric resolution of uncertainty about synergies and asymmetric resolution of uncertainty
about outside options. We nd that, contrary to conventional wisdom, uncertainty often promotes knowl-
edge sharing in our setting.
Symmetric resolution of uncertainty about synergies. We begin with the case where there is
initially uncertainty about the value of the synergies V . In period 1 (the knowledge sharing stage), F
and A only know that V is distributed according to cumulative distribution function G over support
[V ; V ]. However, in period 2 (after knowledge sharing but before implementation), both rms learn the
11We assumed I > 0 to rule out some knife-edge equilibria and simplify the exposition. The analysis would remain
essentially unchanged if we had assumed I  0 instead.
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realization of V . Thus, there is symmetric information in period 3 (the negotiating stage). We assume
V > F + A > V , so that, if synergies V are low, it is e¢ cient to terminate the alliance after knowledge
sharing. Firms are risk neutral. All other features of the model remain the same.
In this setting, it is optimal for F to share knowledge (conditional on A sharing knowledge) if
F +
1
2
Z V
F+A
(V   F   A)dG  1
2
I: (6)
Similarly, it is optimal for A to share knowledge (conditional on F sharing knowledge) if
A +
1
2
Z V
F+A
(V   F   A)dG  1
2
I: (7)
Intuitively, if rms share their knowledge, they appropriate their outside options (F or A) plus half of
the surplus, which accrues only when synergies are su¢ ciently high (V  F + A). By contrast, the
condition for e¢ cient knowledge sharing is
F + A +
Z V
F+A
(V   F   A)dG  I: (8)
Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium under synergy uncertainty and shows how greater uncertainty
(modelled as a mean preserving spread of the original distribution G) a¤ects knowledge sharing.
Proposition 2.
(i). The equilibrium can exhibit underinvestment in knowledge sharing.
(ii). Early termination of an alliance (before implementation) occurs with positive probability, but is
always e¢ cient.
(iii). An increase in uncertainty about synergies makes investment in knowledge sharing more likely.
As in the model without uncertainty, the non-cooperative equilibrium can exhibit underinvestment in
knowledge sharing. However, unlike the baseline model, now an alliance can be terminated early after
knowledge sharing but before implementation if synergies turn out to be low. Proposition 2 also shows
that the incentives for knowledge sharing are greater when there is more uncertainty about the value of
synergies. Intuitively, a mean preserving spread of the distribution of V increases the likelihood of extreme
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(very low and very high) realizations of V . If V is very low, after knowledge sharing the partners can still
obtain F and A. The downside is therefore limited. On the other hand, if V is very high, the partners
can share this large value. This upside of knowledge sharing increases as more extreme realizations of V
become possible. In short, there is an option value associated with knowledge sharing, and the value of
that option increases with the level of uncertainty over synergies.
Asymmetric resolution of uncertainty about outside options. Next, we consider a scenario where
there is initially uncertainty about one of the partners(ex post) outside options, namely A. In period 1
(the knowledge sharing stage), F and A only know that A is distributed according to some distribution
function. In period 2 (after knowledge sharing but before implementation), A learns the realization of A,
but F learns nothing. Thus, in period 3 (the negotiating stage), there is one-sided asymmetric information
(where A has an informational advantage). For tractability, we assume that A is distributed uniformly
on [0; V   F ]. Note that, because V  F + A for all realizations of A, premature termination of the
alliance is never e¢ cient. Firms are risk neutral.
The project is implemented if the rms agree on a division of V . Bargaining occurs as follows. With
probability 1=2, F makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to A, and with probability 1=2, A makes a take-it-or-
leave-it o¤er to F . This procedure, if A was known to both partners, would produce exactly the same
outcome (in expectation) as the Nash bargaining solution in Section 2. All other features of the model
remain the same.
We compare this one-sided asymmetric information scenario to a benchmark scenario where A is
nonstochastic and given by V F2 (the expected value of A when A is distributed uniformly on [0; V  
F ]). Welfare is dened as the sum of the rmsexpected payo¤s in period 1 (before the resolution of
uncertainty). We can show the following.
Proposition 3.
(i). In the one-sided asymmetric information scenario, premature termination of the alliance occurs
with positive probability and is ine¢ cient. In the benchmark scenario, premature termination of the
alliance never occurs.
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(ii). Despite this ine¢ ciency, investments in knowledge sharing and welfare can be higher in the one-sided
asymmetric information scenario than in the benchmark scenario.12
Proposition 3 shows that, although asymmetric information always creates an ine¢ ciency relative to
the rst best, compared to a benchmark scenario with complete information, asymmetric information
can improve welfare. The intuition is as follows. When making an o¤er x at the negotiating stage,
the uninformed player (rm F ) trades-o¤ a smaller gain V   x when the o¤er is accepted for a greater
probability Pr(A  x) that the o¤er is accepted. In the optimum, therefore, Fs makes an o¤er which is
rejected with positive probability. This is ine¢ cient and welfare is reduced.
However, the incentives to share knowledge can be higher in the one-sided asymmetric information sce-
nario than in the benchmark scenario. The reason is that asymmetric information improves the bargaining
position of the informed party (A). Knowledge sharing may not be possible with symmetric information
(because F is much larger than A), but asymmetric information can improve As bargaining position
so much that knowledge sharing is possible under one-sided asymmetric information. Thus, asymmetric
information can help balance an initially unbalanced relationship.
3 Commitments to encourage knowledge sharing
So far we have shown that appropriability hazards can lead to underinvestment in knowledge sharing.
Next, we consider commitments that prospective partners can make to encourage knowledge sharing when
appropriability hazards are severe. These strategies include: (i) restricting ones own absorptive capacity,
(ii) alliance portfolio design, and (iii) contractual solutions. Throughout, we will assume with no essential
loss of generality that F is the strongpartner, in the sense that F > A. Thus, the binding knowledge
sharing constraint will generally be that of the weakpartner A.13
3.1 Restricting ones own absorptive capacity
An inuential literature in strategy stresses that attempts to appropriate the returns from collaboration
may generate learning races, where partners try to absorb their partnersknowledge while protecting their
12 In the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A, we provide a precise characterization of the set of parameter values for
which welfare is higher in the one-sided asymmetric information scenario than in the benchmark scenario.
13 In the alliance portfolio case, identifying whose knowledge sharing constraint is binding is less straightforward.
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own (e.g., Hamel, 1991; Khanna et al., 1998). Our model suggests that strengthening one owns bargaining
position beyond a point may be counterproductive because it may discourage knowledge sharing.
In this section we develop a simple extension of the model where rms invest in their ability to absorb
external knowledge, which in turn improves their bargaining position vis-à-vis their partner. We show
that, when the need of encouraging knowledge sharing is taken into account, rms do not always want
to maximize their receptivity to their partnersknowledge. Instead, they may sometimes intentionally
restrict their own learning capability to encourage knowledge sharing. Thus, the model can potentially
explain why in reality rms seldom appear to exhibit a racing intent (Mowery et al., 1996; Hennart et al.,
1999; Inkpen, 2000) and their behavior is instead best described as cooperative (Inkpen, 2005).
We assume that, in period 0 (prior to the knowledge sharing stage), rms invest in their absorptive
capacity. These investments are irreversible, observable and a¤ect rmsoutside options in case of prema-
ture termination of the alliance.14 Specically, we assume that, if rm i = F;A chooses a low absorptive
capacity in period 0 (at cost cLi ), then its ex post outside option in period 2 (following knowledge sharing
and premature termination of the alliance) is Li . Conversely, if rm i chooses a high absorptive capacity
(at cost cHi ), then in period 2 its ex post outside option is 
H
i , where 
H
i > 
L
i and V  HF +HA , so that
premature termination of the alliance is not e¢ cient.15
The learning race literature suggests that F should select HF and A should select 
H
A . To bias the
results in this direction, we assume that investments in absorptive capacity are equally costly (i.e., cHF = c
L
F
and cHA = c
L
A). Thus, deviations from the outcome (
H
F ; 
H
A ) must emerge not from cost considerations,
but for purely strategic reasons. We will interpret the choice of the strong partner F to restrict its own
absorptive capacity (i.e., to choose LF instead of 
H
F ) as a commitment to encourage knowledge sharing.
Finally, to reduce the number of cases to consider, we assume that LF  HA . This implies that the focal
rm F is always the faster learner (or stronger partner), while A is always the slower learner (or
14 Irreversibility and observability are key features of credible commitments (Schelling, 1960; Morgan and Várdy, 2013).
For a commitment to an action to be credible, the commitment must be irreversible, or at least reneging must be su¢ ciently
costly. In our model, irreversibility is captured by a sequential choice of actions. The assumption that a commitment to an
action is observable may not always be warranted in practice. Below, we illustrate how a commitment to protect a partners
condential information can be made visible, with reference to Intels well-publicized distinction between Job 1and Job
2.
15Allowing larger investments in absorptive capacity to also increase the joint value V does not pose any di¢ culties but
neither does it provide any insights.
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weaker partner). All other features of the model in Section 2 remain the same.
Proposition 4 below shows that the learning race intuition is in general incorrect. Partners do some-
times engage in learning races and maximize their absorptive capacity (case (iii) below). However, in
some circumstances they purposefully limit their absorptive capacity and increase their partners payo¤
(case (ii)).
Proposition 4. Suppose knowledge sharing is e¢ cient (V  I), rm F is always the faster learner
(LF  HA ), and investments in absorptive capacity are equally costly ( cHF = cLF and cHA = cLA). In
equilibrium:
(i) If V  I < LF  HA , the rms do not invest in knowledge sharing. The choices of absorptive capacity
are inconsequential.
(ii) If V   I 2 [LF   HA ; HF   HA ), the rms invest in knowledge sharing. Firm F selects LF and rm
A selects HA .
(iii) If V   I  HF   HA , the rms invest in knowledge sharing. Firm F selects HF and rm A selects
HA .
Proposition 4 shows that, when rms are very asymmetric in terms of their absorptive capacities
(case (i)), knowledge sharing does not occur. Asymmetries lead to a breakdown of cooperation, and the
resulting outcome is ine¢ cient. If instead rms are relatively similar in terms of their absorptive capacities
(case (iii)), a learning race takes place. Both rms maximally invest in absorptive capacity, but this still
leads to a fairly symmetric outcome. Thus, they still nd it privately protable to invest in knowledge
sharing.
The most interesting case arises when absorptive capacities are asymmetric but not excessively so
(case (ii)). A strategy of maximizing absorptive capacity becomes self-defeating for the stronger partner
F . By maximizing its absorptive capacity, rm F discourages rm A from sharing its knowledge. F is
better o¤ by limiting its absorptive capacity to LF , thus sharing more surplus with A.
There are many examples of rms that appear to deliberately reduce their own absorptive capacity
to facilitate cooperation with their partners. Cisco, for instance, is a rm that has successfully managed
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a large number of alliances in a variety of sectors, geographies and technological areas. Cisco recognizes
that conicts can arise when partners are exposed to each others knowledge. Steve Steinhilber, Vice
President of strategic alliances at Cisco, notes that:
One of the most contentious issues in negotiating the condentiality terms of an alliance
agreement is the treatment of residuals that is, general knowledge, know-how, and the skills
that each partners employees will gain by being exposed to the other partys condential
information (2008: 101). [...] you face considerable risk [...]. You could open your doors to a
company that could hurt you in your own market over time, gain competitive advantages, or
acquire unique knowledge or skills that it could not have obtained otherwise (2008: 114).
Steinhilber recommends that partners establish ground rules to manage information security and intellec-
tual property rights. These rules should be designed not simply to protect one owns resources, but also
to ensure that all the partners are treated fairly and nobodys knowledge is mishandled. In particular,
Steinhilber suggests that rewalls may sometimes be created to prevent Cisco from learning too much
from its partners. Specically, he recommends:
Setting clear parameters in your agreements that identify the information to be shared and
the permitted use of such information. In certain instances, it may be necessary to restrict
information to some employees and to set up rewalls to prevent tainting other groups within
the company that are developing similar technology independently. [...] Setting up training
and procedures to protect your partners condential information and watching for actions by
your partner that may signal an improper use of your own information (2008: 119; emphasis
added).
In the context of our model, we can interpret Ciscos internal Chinese wallsas a commitment to reduce
its own absorptive capacity. If the relationship between Cisco and one of its partners were to break down,
Cisco would arguably see no impediment to removing these barriers and using any information that it
may have gleaned during the collaboration. However, this information would only be transmitted with
delay, after the alliance has been terminated and the communication barriers have been removed. These
delays would imply lower rival benets F to Cisco and higher rival benets A to its partner (because
competition between Cisco and the partner would be delayed). Both e¤ects would encourage Ciscos
partners to invest in knowledge sharing.
Toyota and Intel provide further illustrations of how setting up internal Chinese walls can facilitate
collaboration. Toyota benets greatly from the development and di¤usion of production knowledge within
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its supplier network. To encourage partners to share their knowledge, Toyota took the conscious decision
to separate its operations management consulting division from its purchasing division, so that suppliers
can work with the consultants without fearing that purchasing will ask for a price decrease after the
consultation(Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000: 358-359). As Hajime Ohba, the head of Toyota Supplier Support
Center, notes: Our job is to help suppliers improve, not to worry about who gets the additional prots
(quoted in Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000: 359). Because suppliers appropriate in the short run a large fraction of
the benets from collaboration, this arrangement gives them strong incentives to participate in knowledge
sharing activities.
Intel also faces signicant tensions when collaborating with partners (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). On
the one hand, Intel wants to expand demand for its microprocessors (Job 1), which requires encouraging
the entry of complementary products such as new graphics cards and chip sets. On the other hand, Intel
also wants to grow protable businesses in complementary markets (Job 2). Intels dilemma is how
to encourage complementors to enter, while ex post it may have an incentive to compete with them.
Gawer and Cusumano argue that one method is to create separate groups or divisions pursuing Job 1 or 2.
For example, the Intel Architecture Lab (IAL) was explicitly structured as a cost center and rewarded for
its success in promoting the health of the whole ecosystem (Job 1). As Andy Grove notes: IAL has no
prot-and-loss responsibility, and no products. [...] And IAL has achieved an extra measure of credibility.
It comes, rst, from the fact that they are very good, and second, that they are not in a business(quoted
in Gawer and Cusumano, 2002: 128; emphasis in original).
IAL head Craig Kinnie (also quoted in Gawer and Cusumano, 2002: 128) similarly notes the impor-
tance of IAL being perceived as fair and impartial. Consistent with the literature on credible commitments
and our model, he also emphasizes that the separation of roles between IAL and other Intel units must
be externally visible:
To deserve the trust, a separation of roles inside the organization is an absolute necessity. And
it has to be observable from the outside. There is a tension between the two perspectives: the
Lab perspective and the product groupsperspective. [...] It is also important to keep that
polarity for the sake of enrolling others on the outside. If the labs were buried inside of the
product groups, the perceived neutrality and trustworthiness of the labs would go down.
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Taken together, these examples suggest that commitments to protect a partners condential information
can help encourage knowledge sharing in alliances. Interestingly, and in line with our model, in all the
above examples it was the leading rm (Cisco, Intel, Toyota) that reduced its own absorptive capac-
ity. Clearly, incumbents do not always behave like sharks, but sometimes adopt apparently altruistic
behaviors, motivated by the need to engender trust and encourage knowledge sharing.16
4 Alliance portfolio design
In this section we study how alliance portfolios can be designed to facilitate knowledge sharing. We
assume that, in period 0, the focal rm F chooses (i) whether to be involved in one or more dyadic
alliances and, if it is involved in more than one alliance, (ii) the degree of similarity among its alliance
partners. The key contribution of this section is to distinguish between two types of substitutability and
show that there is a type of substitutability that facilitates, not hinder, knowledge sharing. We also show
that, regardless of which type of substitutability is more important, F typically benets from choosing
partners that are neither too similar nor too dissimilar from each other. A key message of this section is
that, because there is a goodtype of substitutability, alliance portfolios can facilitate knowledge sharing.
Knowledge sharing may not be feasible in a single alliance, but may be feasible in a portfolio.
4.1 Partner substitutability and knowledge sharing
A recent literature focuses on alliance portfolios and interdependencies among partners. At the risk of
simplifying a complex subject, this literature suggests that overlaps among alliance partners reduce value:
they reduce the potential for synergies and increase conict among partners. The result, according to this
logic, is lower stability of alliances and lower value to the focal rm (e.g., Vasudeva and Anand, 2011;
Wassmer and Dussauge, 2011).17
16The model can also be extended to examine the issue of the opacity of a rms operations. The learning race literature
argues that rms should minimize the transparency of their own operations, thus reducing their partnersabsorptive capacity.
In terms of our model, F , instead of increasing its own absorptive capacity (leading to a higher F ), could reduce the
transparency of its own operations (leading to a lower A). Arguments analogous to the ones in Proposition 4 show that, in
some cases, a leading rm F may nd it benecial to increase the transparency of its own operations. An example would be
Toyota opening its operations to General Motors, to teach its partner (and competitor) valuable lean manufacturing practices
(Inkpen, 2005).
17On the other hand, as Lavie (2007) notes, greater overlap among alliance partners increases the relative bargaining power
of the focal rm. Cui (2013) argues that similarity or redundancy of resources among alliance partners may benet the focal
rm by securing access to resources in uncertain environments.
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We revisit these ideas through the lens of our model. We consider a setting where a focal rm F
collaborates with two partners, A and B. Thus, there are two dyadic alliances, one between F and A,
and one between F and B. We say that A and B are substitutes if they allow F to access similar pools
of knowledge. We distinguish between two types of substitutability: substitutability in implementation
and substitutability in rival benets.
Substitutability in implementation refers to situations where the contribution of a former partner
to the implementation of a project can partly be replaced by the contribution of the staying partner.
For instance, suppose F and A share knowledge to develop new articial intelligence (AI) algorithms.
If this alliance is prematurely terminated (after knowledge sharing but before implementation), F may
be able to develop its own algorithms (a rivalproject). In implementing this rival project, Fs other
(staying) partner may help. Specically, if the alliance between B and F is not prematurely terminated,
the value of the rival project will increase from F to F + sImp. Here, sImp  0 measures the value of
Bs contribution to the implementation of the rival project.18
By contrast, substitutability in rival benets refers to situations where the knowledge gained by former
partners is partly overlapping, so that the rival benets from prematurely terminating both alliances are
lower. For example, suppose F acquires AI competencies from both A and B and there are two rival
projects where F can redeploy these capabilities: algorithms for image classication and algorithms for
speech recognition. Suppose further that algorithms for image classication are more valuable to F than
algorithms for speech recognition. If only one alliance is prematurely terminated (say the one with A),
then F could redeploy the engineers working with A to work on image classication, thus yielding rival
benets F . However, if both alliances are prematurely terminated, both the engineers working with A
and the engineers working with B could be redeployed. One group would work on image classication,
yielding rival benets F , while the other group would work on speech recognition, yielding rival benets
F   sRB, so that Fs total payo¤ would be 2F   sRB. Here sRB  0 measures substitutability in rival
benets. This notion captures the idea that, if A and Bs knowledge bases are similar, the marginal
returns to prematurely terminating multiple alliances are likely to be decreasing.
18By contrast, if the alliance between F and B is prematurely terminated, then B will not be willing to help F with the
rival project.
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We incorporate these two notions of substitutability in a simple extension of the model studied in
Section 2. To reduce notation, we assume that Fs alliances are completely symmetric in terms of payo¤s.
Thus, for instance, F obtains the same baseline outside option (or rival benet) F , regardless of whether
the alliance with A or B is prematurely terminated. If neither pair shares knowledge, all rms obtain the
same payo¤s, normalized to zero. A and Bs outside options following premature termination are also set
for simplicity equal to zero: A = B = 0.
We begin with the case where F and A share knowledge, but F and B do not. Then, it is as if B did
not exist and the analysis follows the same steps as in Section 2. Knowledge sharing is e¢ cient if V  I;
however, it is privately protable for both F and A only if V   I  F . Thus, in equilibrium there can
be underinvestment in knowledge sharing.
Next, consider the case where knowledge sharing occurs in both alliances. Let v(S) be the value
created by coalition S 2 fF;A;B; FA; FB;AB;FABg when (i) the rms in S implement their projects
together and (ii) the alliances between the rms in S and the rms not in S are terminated prematurely.
Thus, v(FAB) is the value created by coalition FAB when both F and A and F and B implement their
projects together. v(FA) is the value created by coalition FA when F and A implement their project
together but the alliance between F and B is prematurely terminated. v(A) is the value created by A
when the alliance between F and A is prematurely terminated.19 All values v are gross of knowledge
sharing costs.
We assume v(FAB) = 2V + b. V is the baselinevalue created by F and A (or F and B) working
together. The synergistic benet b  0 captures complementarities between A and B in implementation.
By combining A and Bs capabilities during the implementation stage, the coalition FAB creates b more
value than if A and B were involved in two completely unrelated alliances. When the alliance between
F and B is terminated prematurely, the coalition FA obtains v(FA) = V + F + sImp, where V is
the value created by F and A implementing their project together and F + sImp is the value created
by F and A working on the rival project originating from the terminated alliance with B. We assume
sImp 2 [0; V   F ], which implies that prematurely terminating an alliance is not e¢ cient.
19Whether or not the alliance between F and B is prematurely terminated is irrelevant for determining v (A). In both
cases, we assume v (A) = 0.
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If both alliances are terminated prematurely, the values created by coalitions F , A and B are, respec-
tively v (F ) = 2F   sRB, v (A) = 0 and v (B) = 0. Non-focal partners always get a payo¤ of 0 if they do
not implement their projects with F . The focal partner F , by contrast, can work on two rival projects,
earning 2F   sRB, where sRB measures substitutability in rival benets. We assume sRB 2 [0; F ].20
Table 1 summarizes the values created by all the possible non-empty coalitions following knowledge
sharing. If the alliances between F and A and F and B were completely unrelated, we would have
b = sImp = sRB = 0.
TABLE 1: Coalitional values after knowledge sharing
Neither collaboration is
terminated prematurely v(FAB) = 2V + b
One and only one
collaboration is terminated
prematurely
v(FA) = v(FB) = V + F + s
Imp
v (AB) = 0
Both collaborations are
terminated prematurely
v (F ) = 2F   sRB
v (A) = v (B) = 0
Following Hart and Moore (1990), we use the Shapley value to assign payo¤s to individual rms. If
knowledge sharing occurs, then the grand coalitionFAB will emerge because it creates the greatest
total value.21 The Shapley value assigns each rm its expected marginal contribution assuming that the
order in which they joint the grand coalition is random. Formally, for i = F;A;B and any subset of rms
S  N = fF;A;Bg, the value assigned to rm i is:
i =
X
SNnfig
jSj!(jN j   jSj   1)!
jN j! (v(S [ fig)  v(S))
where jSj denotes the number of rms in S and, for any positive integer r, r! = 1 2 ::: r, and 0! = 1.
20sRB = F would capture a situation where either A or Bs knowledge is completely redundant in creating rival benets.
sRB < 0 represents complementarities in rival benets. For instance, if a large mass of AI scientists was necessary to create
substantial rival benets, the partners are complements in rival benets.
21 Indeed, sImp 2 [0; V   F ] implies that coalitional values v satisfy superadditivity: v (S [ T )  v (S) + v (T ) for any two
disjoint set of rms S and T .
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The Shapley value yields the expressions for the rms(gross) payo¤s:22
F = V + F +
1
3
b+
1
3
(sImp   sRB) (9)
A = B =
1
2
(V   F ) + 1
3
b  1
6
(sImp   sRB). (10)
As the single alliance case, the fact that F can use the knowledge learnt from its partners on rival
projects shifts the balance of power in its favor F gets an additional 12F from each partner, and A and
B lose the same amount. The synergistic value b is created only if all the rms work together; hence b is
split equally among them. Substitutability in implementation has both costs and benets for A and B.
On the one hand, A can be replaced by B, which lowers As bargaining power vis-à-vis F . On the other
hand, A may replace B. In this case, A will share the benets of substitutability in implementation with
F . The cost of lower bargaining power for A (and similarly for B) is 13s
Imp, while the benet of replacing
B is just 16s
Imp. The benet is half the cost because the gains from replacing B does not just accrue to
A, but must be split between A and F . Thus, A and B on average lose as a result of implementation
substitutability, and F gains. Finally, substitutability in rival benets sRB lowers the outside option of
the focal rm F in case both alliances are terminated and therefore weakens Fs bargaining position
vis-à-vis A and B. Thus, sRB appears with a negative sign in equation (9), and with a positive sign in
equation (10).
Dene F = F   I; A = A   12I and B = B   12I. Knowledge sharing in both alliances is
privately protable for all partners if i  0 for all i = F;A;B. Knowledge sharing in both alliances is
e¢ cient if 2V + b  2I. To facilitate the comparison with the single alliance case, we assume that the
knowledge sharing condition for the focal rm holds i.e., F  0, but those of the weakpartners may
not hold. We have the following.
Proposition 5. Suppose V  I. In alliance portfolios:
22To compute F , one can proceed as follows. There are six possible ways in which rms F , A and B can be ordered:
FAB, FBA, AFB, BFA, ABF and BAF . The marginal contribution of F when F is the rst rm to join the grand
coalition (orderings FAB and FBA) is v(F ) v(?) = 2F  sRB . The marginal contribution of F when F is the second rm
to join the grand coalition (orderings AFB and BFA) is v(AF )   v(A) = v(BF )   v(B) = V + F + sImp. The marginal
contribution of F when F is the third rm to join the grand coalition (orderings ABF and BAF ) is v(ABF )   v(AB) =
v(BAF )   v(BA) = 2V + b. Because all orderings are equiprobable, we obtain equation (9). A and B are computed
similarly.
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(i). Substitutability in rival benets facilitates knowledge sharing, while substitutability in implementation
hinders it. Synergies in implementation also facilitate knowledge sharing.
(ii). Synergies in implementation have a larger e¤ect in facilitating knowledge sharing than substitutabil-
ity in implementation has in hindering it. More precisely, suppose b = k1 +  and sImp = k2 + .
Then knowledge sharing becomes more likely in alliance portfolios as  grows.
These results follow from the knowledge sharing constraints of the weakpartners:
A;B  0 , V   I   F + 2
3
b  1
3
(sImp   sRB)  0. (11)
The analysis suggests two reasons why substitutability may not be as bad at discouraging knowledge
sharing as generally thought. First, we identify a type of substitutability, substitutability in rival benets
sRB, which facilitates rather than hinders knowledge sharing. Second, we show that synergies in imple-
mentation b have a larger e¤ect in facilitating knowledge sharing than substitutability in implementation
sImp has in hindering it. The reason, as mentioned above, is that substitutability in implementation has
some benecial e¤ects for non-focal partners. A non-focal partner may lose a lot when it is replaced, but
it may also gain a little when it is instrumental in replacing another non-focal partner.
An implication of our analysis is that knowledge sharing in a portfolio can be feasible, while knowledge
sharing in a single alliance may not be.
Proposition 6. Suppose V  I. If V   I 2 [F   23b+ 13(sImp   sRB); F ), then knowledge sharing in a
portfolio is feasible, while knowledge sharing in a single alliance is not.
Proposition 6 suggests that one way to encourage knowledge sharing when appropriability hazards
are present is to create alliance portfolios with desirable characteristics. The strategy of adding a third
partner (i.e., a second dyadic alliance) is benecial not only when there are synergies in implementation
between non-focal partners, but also when substitutability in rival benets is signicant.
4.2 Similarity between alliance partners
Besides selecting the rightnumber of partners, a focal rm must also select partners with the right
characteristics. Here we examine the following question: Should the focal rm F choose non-focal partners
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that are similar to each other (i.e., with a large degree of substitutability), or partners that are di¤erent
from each other (with a low degree of substitutability)?
To answer this question, let sImp = 	 and sRB = (1   )	. The parameter 	  0 measures
the degree of similarity between A and B. A high degree of similarity between A and B increases both
substitutability in implementation and substitutability in rival benets.  2 [0; 1] is a parameter capturing
to what extent substitutability in implementation is more important than substitutability in rival benet.
If  = 1, then only substitutability in implementation matters. If  = 0, then only substitutability in rival
benet is important. By varying , we can examine how our results depend on the type of substitutability.
Proposition 7 below shows that, regardless of which type of substitutability is more important, F
should often choose partners that are neither too similar or too dissimilar from each other.
Proposition 7. Suppose sImp = 	 and sRB = (1  )	, where 	  0 and  2 [0; 1].
(i). If  < 12 and V   I   F + 23b  0, then Fs equilibrium payo¤ rst rises then declines with 	.
The optimum level of similarity from Fs viewpoint is 	 = 3(V I F )+2b2 1 .
(ii). If  < 12 and V   I  F + 23b > 0, then Fs equilibrium payo¤ monotonically declines with 	. The
optimum level of similarity from Fs viewpoint is zero.
(iii). If  > 12 and V   I   F + 23b  0, then Fs equilibrium payo¤ is independent of 	 and always
equal to 0.
(iv). If  > 12 and V   I   F + 23b > 0, then Fs equilibrium payo¤ rst rises then declines with 	.
The optimum level of similarity from Fs viewpoint is 	 = 3(V I F )+2b2 1 .
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Proposition 7 suggests that the relationship between the value that F can appropriate and the degree
of similarity of its alliance partners is typically non-monotonic. The reason is that there are in general
two conicting e¤ects at play: (i) on the focal rms payo¤ conditional on knowledge sharing and (ii) on
the weak partnersincentives to share knowledge.
23 If  = 1
2
, then Fs equilibrium payo¤ is independent of 	 and equal to V   I + v + 1
3
b.
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Consider substitutability in implementation rst. A high degree of similarity 	 between non-focal
partners benets F conditional on knowledge sharing because it strengthens Fs bargaining power. How-
ever, too much similarity reduces the non-focal partnersincentives to share knowledge, with detrimental
e¤ects on F as well. Thus, the optimum level of similarity between non-focal partners from Fs viewpoint
is intermediate (Proposition 7, case (iv)).
When substitutability is in rival benets, these e¤ects are reversed. Partner similarity harms F
conditional on knowledge sharing, but also induces the non-focal partners to share knowledge. Initially
(for low levels of similarity), knowledge sharing in an alliance portfolio is not sustainable, and Fs payo¤
is low. However, when 	 crosses 	, knowledge sharing becomes sustainable, so Fs payo¤ suddenly rises.
As 	 grows further, substitutability in rival benets monotonically reduces Fs payo¤ (Proposition 7,
case (i)).
Thus, regardless of which type of substitutability is more important, F is often better o¤ by choosing
partners that are neither too similar nor too dissimilar to each other. The relationship between Fs payo¤
and non-focal partner similarity 	 has often an inverted-U shape (cases (i) and (iv)).
This basic intuition is complicated by the fact that initial conditions also matter. Depending on the
initial propensity of its alliance partners to share knowledge (whether V   I   F + 23b 7 0), only part
of the inverted-U curve may be observed. Case (ii) describes a situation where, because substitutability
is mostly in rival benets ( < 12) and knowledge sharing can always be sustained, partner similarity is
always detrimental to F . Hence the optimal value of partner similarity from Fs viewpoint is zero. Case
(iii) describes a situation where knowledge sharing can never be sustained. In that case, because there is
no knowledge sharing, the degree of partner similarity is inconsequential.
The complexity of these predictions may help explain the variety of often conicting empirical results.
Swaminathan and Moorman (2009) nd that alliance announcements create value (i.e., abnormal stock
returns) especially when the degree to which the rms network of alliances involves rms that possess
nonredundant knowledge, skills, and capabilities is moderate. Vasudeva and Anand (2011) nd an in-
verted U-shaped relationship between the technological diversity in a focal rms alliance portfolio and
the likelihood that the focal rm cites its partners patents. Cui and OConnor (2012) nd no statisti-
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cally signicant relationship between alliance portfolio resource diversity and innovation, although several
interaction e¤ects are signicant, while Goerzen and Beamish (2005) and Cui (2013) nd monotonic
relationships. Our theory can help rationalize these ndings; however, further research is surely needed.
5 Contractual solutions
Contractual solutions to the hold-up problem have been extensively studied in economics (see Segal
and Whinston, 2013, for a survey). In this section, we examine contractual solutions that appear to be
important in practice. We argue that, although contracts can facilitate knowledge sharing, their usefulness
is often limited.
Payments to share knowledge. A contract specifying payments from the strong partner to the
weakpartner to encourage knowledge sharing does not solve the underinvestment problem highlighted
in this paper. The reason is that knowledge sharing is not observable by a court. Thus, the weak partner
would sign the contract, accept the payment, and then would not share knowledge if that was not in its
own interest.
Termination fee contracts. Termination fee contracts may also appear to be a potential solution
(Williamson, 1983). However, they will not work in our model.
Suppose collaboration is e¢ cient (V  I) but the weak partner will not share knowledge (i.e., V  F+
A < I ). To avoid this problem, suppose F o¤ers a contract to A that pays x to A if the collaboration
terminates prematurely, before joint implementation. In this case, once knowledge sharing has occurred,
Fs outside option is F   x, and As outside option is A + x. The new gross payo¤s that accrue to F
and A after negotiations are thus, respectively, 12(V + F   A)  x and 12(V   F + A) + x.
For knowledge sharing to occur, it must be protable for the weak partner:
1
2
(V   F + A) + x  1
2
I: (12)
However, with a termination fee, the weak partner may behave opportunistically. Specically, A may not
share knowledge simply to force termination and get a payment of x. To prevent such behavior, x has to
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be less than As payo¤ from not reneging and sharing knowledge, i.e.,
x  1
2
(V   F + A) + x  1
2
I (13)
() (V   F + A)  I  0:
But (13) cannot hold because we assumed V   F + A   I < 0. That is, a contract that encourages
knowledge sharing also encourages opportunistic behavior by A.
Equity alliances. In the model in Section 2, there is no contract specifying how the returns from
collaboration are divided. We simply assumed that, given outside options (F ; A), partners split the
surplus V   (F + A) equally among themselves. However, if the partners can commit to a contract
that species a certain division of the surplus, should they implement their project together, they can
improve outcomes. Consider a contract such that, if the partners implement their project together, a
share  2 [0; 1] of the surplus goes to A, and the share 1    of the surplus goes to F . The partners
payo¤s conditional on knowledge sharing are:24
EF = F + (1  ) [V   F   A] 
1
2
I (14)
EA = A + [V   F   A] 
1
2
I: (15)
Importantly, contract  does not oblige the rms to share knowledge or implement the project together.
Instead, F and A can choose between doing so and realizing the payo¤s specied under the contract or
separating and obtaining their respective outside options. The key assumption we make here is that the
partners are unable to renegotiate the contract  in period 2 (after knowledge sharing). If they could
do so, then we would expect their (re)negotiation to produce the same outcome as in Section 2, because
their ex ante bargaining weights are the same.
Proposition 8 below compares equityalliances associated with contract  to the non-equityalliances
where  = 1=2 (that is, the alliances studied in Section 2). We say that knowledge sharing can be
24An equivalent way of describing the partners payo¤s is to dene a contract  such that EF = (1   )V   12I and
EA = V   12I, subject to the constraints that (1   )V  F and V  A. These constraints dene upper and lower
bounds to As equity share  which ensure that partners have no incentives to prematurely terminate the alliance after
knowledge sharing. The case where  reaches its lower bound corresponds to the case where  = 0, so that all the surplus
goes to rm F . The case where  reaches its upper bound corresponds to the case where all the surplus goes to rm A
( = 1).
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implemented by an equity alliance if there exists an equity share  2 [0; 1] such that both partners are
willing to share knowledge. Similarly, we say that knowledge sharing can be implemented by a non-equity
alliance if both partners are willing to share knowledge when  = 1=2.
Proposition 8.
(i). If knowledge sharing can be implemented by a non-equity alliance, then it can also be implemented
by an equity alliance. However, the converse is not true.
(ii). If knowledge sharing can be implemented by an equity alliance but not by a non-equity alliance, then
F > A implies  > 1=2, and F < A implies  < 1=2.
(iii). Even if knowledge sharing is e¢ cient, knowledge sharing may not be implementable by an equity
alliance.
Part (i) is obvious. Non-equity alliances are a special case of equity alliances. Thus, if knowledge
sharing can be implemented by a non-equity alliance, it can also be implemented by an equity alliance,
but the reverse is not necessarily true.
Part (ii) shows how equity alliances can be structured to facilitate knowledge sharing when non-equity
alliances are ine¤ective. Suppose non-equity alliances are ine¤ective because knowledge sharing shifts
bargaining positions excessively in favor of F (i.e., F is much larger than A). Then, F may grant the
weaker partner A a larger share of the surplus ( > 1=2) to encourage knowledge sharing. Equity alliances
help because they allow partners to exibly distribute the gains from collaboration. The rm experiencing
an adverse shift in bargaining position can be compensated with a greater share of the surplus. The strong
partner can commit to a more generousdistribution of the surplus (see also Panico 2011 for a related
result).
Part (iii), however, shows that, although equity alliances facilitate knowledge sharing, they cannot
completely solve the problem. The reason is that shifts in bargaining positions can be large relative to
the joint surplus. Partners always retain the option of terminate the alliance at the negotiation stage.
Thus, F cannot get less than F and A cannot get less than A at the negotiation stage. But, if F is
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very large, then there may be very little surplus V  F  A to compensate A for sharing knowledge. As
a result, knowledge sharing may not be implementable, even if it is socially e¢ cient.
6 Conclusion
Firms enter into alliances for a variety of reasons: to facilitate collusion and increase market power (Porter
and Fuller, 1986), to share risks and take advantage of new opportunities (Kogut, 1991), to pool resources
with other rms (Hennart, 1988) and to acquire new skills and capabilities (Hamel, 1991; Mowery et al.,
1996; Khanna et al., 1998).
In this paper, we focus on alliances where an important objective is the acquisition of new skills and
capabilities (learning alliances), but where contracts are incomplete and rms cannot commit to exploit
the newly created knowledge jointly. Firms share knowledge to create value (e.g., new products). However,
knowledge sharing also creates appropriability hazards. For instance, a rm may steal a partners trade
secrets, or asymmetric learning may occur. In the latter case, the faster learner may over time be able to
reduce its dependency on the partner and appropriate a greater share of the collaborative pie. All these
risks, if foreseen, can discourage knowledge sharing, unless contractual or other types of safeguards exist.
Our paper emphasizes commitments that leading rms can make to encourage knowledge sharing. Our
theory does not negate the importance of safeguards or knowledge protection; however, it does provide
a more nuanced perspective, by incorporating also the incentives of leading rms to create a safe space
for collaboration.
The paper has several implications that are relevant to managers and practitioners. A basic but
important point is that managers must be aware of their partnersincentives to collaborate. If leading
rms do not leave su¢ cient rents to their alliance partners, the latter will not participate in collaborative
endeavours, or will only participate in a perfunctory or opportunistic manner.
Leading rms can build structures to lessen partners appropriability concerns. These structures
sometimes involve Chinese wallsthat compartmentalize and protect partnerscondential information.
For instance, Toyota deliberately took steps to separate its operations management consulting division
from its purchasing division, so that suppliers would share information with Toyota without worrying
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that this might constrain their future pricing exibility.
Our theory, by emphasizing the broader theme of commitment to treat partners fairly (and share rents),
also highlights the importance of the credibility of such commitments. In the case of Intel Architecture
Lab (IAL), credibility was enhanced by the fact that IAL was separated from Intels other businesses, and
that this separation was observable from the outside. This separation, by mitigating competitive threats
from Intels other units, increased complementorsincentives to collaborate with IAL. This approach also
provides a di¤erent perspective on learning races. Managers should not always try to win the race but
should instead sometimes constrain their ability to appropriate value, to encourage collaboration and
knowledge sharing.
Alliance portfolio design can also be used to implicitly commit to low levels of appropriation of
partners knowledge, by creating alliance portfolios with desirable characteristics. We show that the
simple intuition that alliance portfolios should be constructed to minimize overlaps in technology among
partners is potentially misleading because there are types of partner substitutability that may encourage
rather than hinder knowledge sharing. Our theory also suggests that managers should select partners
that are neither too similar nor too dissimilar to each other, because partner substitutability has opposing
e¤ects on value creation and value capture by the focal rm.
Alliances are by denition not zero-sum games. Instead, they have the potential to create value. Value
capture strategies must be balanced against the need to ensure value creation. Our focus on the need
to induce knowledge sharing by the weaker partner is, at the most abstract level, an attempt put the
emphasis back on value creation.
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